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This publication addresses whether the conventional principle that the Table of 
Distribution and Allowances (TDA) is a one-size-fits-all tool to make human 
resource/human capital decisions based on the TDA’s methodology. 
 Our research found that this is an unsupported and perhaps costly assumption that 
will not support, or enhance, the Army’s 2025 expressed goal, also known as “Force 
2025.” The overarching goal of “Force 2025” is the creation of a leaner force equal to, or 
more capable than, today’s forces. Our research focused on the second- and third-order 
effects that decisions made to use a TDA could potentially have on an organization and 
the organization’s ability to remain competitively relevant.  
This paper demonstrates why TDA is not the best, or even the preferred, method 
to make human capital decisions for research and development organizations that are 
primarily funded through the reimbursement mechanism. We believe these organizations 
focus on methodologies that make civilian workforces leaner and more efficient by using 
cross-knowledge transfers and a cross-utilization of resources and creating holistic 
synergies by the practice of working on multiple projects simultaneously. We believe our 
findings have broader applications to other reimbursable funded organizations; however, 
the extent and scope of our findings will be solely focused on the Army’s R&D 
organizations. 
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This paper examines Army tools and processes for managing manpower and 
equipment in sustaining base organizations and provides a recommended agile approach 
to managing human capital in the future sustaining base workforce. The “sustaining base” 
of the Army consists of all the civilian and military headquarters, logistics, acquisition, 
research and development, and other staff organizations that support the “tactical” Army 
that deploys and fights wars. Some sustaining base organizations such as Research 
Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) require the ability for flexibility to move 
personnel around freely to support multiple missions. The current Table of Distribution 
Allowance (TDA) structure is very rigid and does not easily allow for these organizations 
to move personnel around supporting multiple missions. To get started on the 
examination, this chapter identifies and describes the current standard, the TDA, after 
which it discusses the concept of cross-utilizing personnel and introduces the new 
Workforce Governance and Auditability Pilot (WfGAP) program. 
1. Description and History
The Army has historically used two methods to document the organizational 
structure as well as the requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment. 
Deployable units, originally called line units, are organized and built around the Modified 
Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and consist of only uniformed service 
members. Non-Deployable units, otherwise known as sustaining base units, trace their 
beginnings primarily to staff units and are organized and equipped based on the TDA. 
The TDA can have military members, civilian members or a combination of both. Both 
MTOEs and TDAs are congressionally mandated and published in public statutes 
(“History of Tables,” 1995). Since this study focuses on sustaining base organizations, 
MTOEs and tactical units are outside the scope of this paper and will not be covered 
further.  
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Originally the table of allowances (equipment) was published separately from the 
table of organization. In 1936 the term became “table of distribution” which authorized 
personnel for such units. In 1943, the two tables were consolidated making what is 
today’s Table of Distribution and Allowances (“History of Tables,” 1995). The TDA unit 
is designed in a way that after the mission is completed, the TDA may be rescinded and 
the unit reorganized under a new TDA, reassigned, or retired. TDA units can exist in the 
Continental United States (CONUS) or outside the Continental United States 
(OCONUS). A TDA identifies both the unit and the installation or geographic location to 
which it is assigned (Department of the Army, Regulation 71-32, 2013). 
Today, TDA units’ primary mission is to provide staff, logistics, and sustainment 
support to the tactical Army. “In 1905 34 percent of officer in the Regular Army were 
assigned or detailed to organizations other than line units.” The number rose to a high of 
60 percent throughout the 1930s. “In June of 1989, as the Army began its current 
reduction, the Active component had 55 percent of its authorized officer strength (43,929 
of 80,066), 24 percent of its authorized warrant officer strength (3,474 of 15,415), 22 
percent of its authorized enlisted strength (126,195 of 578,322), and almost 100 percent 
of its authorized civilian strength (397,783 of 397,790) in TDA units” (History of 
Tables,” 1995). 
2. Management of TDAs 
DOD regulation 1100.4, dated February 2005, provides manpower guidance for 
all DOD organizations and is under the cognizance of Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness. Army Regulation (AR) 570–4, dated 8 March 2006, provides 
additional guidance for Army organizations. The Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for and has approval authority for all 
manpower policies in the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (DCS, G-3/5/7) has 
direct responsibility for Army TDA formulations and approvals (“How the Army Runs,” 
2013). 
 To establish a new TDA for an organization the United States Army Force 
Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) initiates the documentation process based on 
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the information provided by Headquarters Department of Army (HQDA) G-3/5/7 staff 
sections (“How the Army Runs,” 2013). The TDA is then staffed with Army commands 
and the appropriate staffs / subject matter experts (SMEs). Once agreed upon and 
approved, the newly established TDA is put into the Command Plan process. The 
Command Plan process is the annual force management process designed to account for 
force structure decisions and directives from the Army leadership 
Existing TDAs and newly implemented TDAs are in the Command Plan process 
and are reviewed annually in June to ensure alignment with HQDA’s Master Force 
(MFORCE) policy. The Command Plan serves to document the implementation of the 
MFORCE policy. The MFORCE policy adjusts previous years’ force structure, 
establishes new force structure and aligns force structure requirements and 
authorizations. The MFORCE also provides manpower, personnel and equipment 
requirements and authorizations. Requirements identify the numbers and categories of 
personnel positions and equipment needed to accomplish unit missions, while 
authorizations reflect those required positions and items of equipment that are funded and 
may be filled or procured and maintained on hand. Typically, an organization’s TDA will 
reflect a number of positions by specialty and items of equipment by type that are 
required along with an equal or lower number of positions that are funded and therefore 
authorized. The appendix contains a few lines of a typical TDA. 
Once the TDAs are scrubbed and the numbers match, manpower end strength is 
not adjusted until approved guidance is issued by HQDA the following June. The 
approved TDAs provide the commands with not only the requirement for each position 
but also authorization for funded positions. An approved TDA also identifies those 
requirements that will remain unfunded (“How the Army Runs,” 2013). 
Army units may request changes to their TDAs based on mission needs. These 
requests must be staffed through USAFMSA for HQDA G-3/5/7 approvals to ensure 
consistency with overarching Army requirements. The approval process can take several 
months, resulting in a significant time gap between when units receive new mission 
tasking and when they obtain the TDA authorizations for personnel and equipment to 
accomplish those missions.  
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3. Management of Workforce to Workload
In view of the inflexibility of the TDA construct and the contrasting success that 
the private sector has had with cross-utilization of personnel, the Army has initiated a 
pilot program called Workforce Governance and Auditability Pilot (WfGAP). WfGAP is 
a construct in which an organization is allowed to assign personnel to multiple tasks or 
functions based on multiple authorities and sources of funding. Under WfGAP, some 
employees may be paid based on their assigned TDA positions using direct funds, 
meaning those funds directly allocated to the unit by the Army Budget Office via the 
budget process. Other employees may be assigned dynamically to single or multiple tasks 
and paid with reimbursable funds received from their customers. Reimbursable funds are 
those that are provided by one organization to another to perform a specific function, 
such as procuring equipment or performing research and development. They may be used 
for employee pay, contracts, and other RDT&E functions. Reimbursable funds may be 
provided by any Department of Defense (DOD) entity, other government entities, and / or 
from the private sector. This allows the organization to task employees to support various 
missions while charging billable time to what they actually work on instead of charging 
only to a general pay fund. The combination of funding sources, coupled with the ability 
to quickly align labor effort with changing customer requirements, lends WfGAP well to 
the government RDT&E environment. 
B. IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY 
Laws and policies covering uniformed personnel give Army MTOE units great 
authority and flexibility in assigning and cross-utilizing personnel to ensure units have 
adequate manpower with the specialized skills to perform assigned missions. The rules 
covering civilian personnel, on the other hand, are much more restrictive, so most TDA 
units, which are comprised primarily of civilian personnel, are not nearly as agile as 
MTOE units in cross-utilizing personnel and shaping units for changing missions. 
Civilian employees have a requirement to work within their job descriptions 90% 
of the time. They are only allowed to work outside their job description more than 10% 
of the time if management gets a waiver, and the persons affected agree to the extended 
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work outside their position descriptions. Many unit TDAs are very diverse, and in many 
cases there is only one authorization for a particular job description (i.e., one logistician, 
one administrative assistant, one budget analyst) so it becomes very hard to justify why a 
logistician is being trained in finance when the individual is in a position authorized for a 
logistician. When cross-utilization happens for any significant length of time, there is an 
official personnel action required, which details that person into that position and their 
originally assigned position is filled by a temporary hire. The process is very time 
consuming and there is no easy way to move people within the organization to maximize 
the skills of the employees for the benefit of the organization. 
In the RDT&E field, the mandated percentage of time spent in an assigned job 
severely hinders the ability to properly plan and find the correct people to perform the 
required mission. In RDT&E, planning is conducted years out and the determination for 
the requirement for a very specific skill set for a specific amount of time such as ½ man-
year or two man-years makes it difficult to always follow the standard TDA structure. 
The time it would take to change the TDA for the proper required structure and then to 
hire a person makes it extremely difficult for the RDT&E Program Manager (PM) to 
properly conduct the Planning, Programming, Budget & Execution (PPBE) process and 
obligate funds correctly while maintaining required manning levels. The ideal situation 
would allow personnel to be in a pool of specialized skills and then utilized across many 
different requirements. 
Many different industries successfully execute cross-utilization of their 
employees, and have for many years. The manufacturing, retail, and fast food industries 
are some of the biggest proponents of employee cross-utilization. The purpose of this 
process in the private industries is to increase profits while keeping expenses to a 
minimum.  
Manufacturing has seen significant technological advances since the Industrial 
Revolution resulting in increased productivity and reduced manpower requirements. 
Those fewer employees must possess a wider variety of skill sets than their peers of the 
past, due to their need to keep up with the evolving technologies and increased 
complexity of manufacturing tasks performed by humans. Thus, manufacturing 
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companies must have the ability to adapt, organize, and train their workforces based on 
rapidly changing technologies and manufacturing techniques.  
Retail and fast food industries likewise have a need to incorporate cross-
utilization practices. The rise in people using the Internet for shopping, as well as people 
wanting to eat healthier has caused these industries to reduce their labor forces. These 
industries have to find a way to supply good customer service while employing fewer 
people in order to maintain profit margins. These fewer employees must be cross-trained 
and cross-utilized among a wide variety of tasks to run their fast food and retail 
operations.  
While the private sector has had some big success stories with their cross-
utilization of personnel, the Army has not done a very good job with cross-utilizing TDA 
personnel. In order to remain agile and look to meet the MFORCE 25 policy 
requirements, the Army has to find a way to allow certain TDA organizations to better 
cross-utilize their personnel. WfGAP is a pilot program that might just provide that 
ability to Army organizations. 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the history of TDAs was introduced, showing not only how they 
came to be, but also how rigid they are in structure. The management of the TDA’s was 
also reviewed, including how the TDA is established from the Command Plan and 
MFORCE policy. This chapter also discussed the WfGAP workforce pilot program that 
the Army is looking at using in some organizations. Cross-utilization by the Army and 
also by the private sector at a broad overview was looked at to show how the Army is 
currently using cross-utilization compared to some of the methods used by the private 
sector.  
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II.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The current mechanism, the TDA, for managing Army organizations, manpower, 
and equipment, and the HQDA approval process, is very rigid and time-consuming, 
resulting in the inability of Army sustaining base organizations to rapidly adapt to 
changing missions or operating conditions. 
The primary problem is the lack of flexibility in the utilization of personnel when 
funding is available but the TDA position and position description does not allow for 
easy movement of personnel. Is it possible for an organization to change its TDA 
structure quickly to accommodate changes in mission using direct funding?  Is the only 
way to change the organizational structure and accommodate mission requirements to use 
reimbursable funding sources?  Once these factors are determined, the scope will be 
narrowed to determine good ways to move or hire personnel that might not fill traditional 
TDA positions. 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to determine the feasibility of cross-
utilizing personnel in RDT&E organizations in an employee pool structure versus the 
traditional TDA structure. This research will examine both cross-utilization of personnel 
and the static structure format of the TDA. The research will examine how these 
structures are affected by direct and reimbursable funding and if one or both types of 
funding allow for a cross-utilization of personnel.  
1.  Research Questions  
Research questions that guide this study in an effort to determine if and where 
there might be some flexibility in the TDA process to allow for a cross-utilization pool. 
• Research Question #1: Under the current TDA structure and guidelines, 
can a Research and Development organizations effectively meet mission 
requirements? 
• Research Question #2: What key factors of the business model used by 
Research & Development (R&D) or similar organizations cause the 
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current TDA process to be inaccurate regarding human capital and 
resource decision-making? 
• Research Question #3: What are the unintended consequences an
organization can face because of human capital and resource decisions
made using the current TDA process?
2. Purpose and Benefit
This study will further define cross-utilization and discuss the impact on the 
workforce and the organization. It will also address initiatives from a pilot program that 
is looking at ways of incorporating the cross-utilization pool. 
Cross-utilization is nothing new. It has become more popular as technology and 
the economy have changed. Cross-utilization of employees allows businesses to use 
technology to the maximum extent while cutting down on the expenses related to 
personnel. Cross-utilization tries to maximize the employees’ skills in the most efficient 
and effective manner. The most common method used by companies is cross-training 
where they train employees in multiple other areas so they can switch roles as required 
and as time allows. This ensures employees are not wasting time with less profitable 
tasks. The first recorded evidence of larger companies using cross-utilization of 
employees was Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance in the 1950s. In order to see how 
computers would impact businesses worldwide, Northwestern conducted a study bringing 
employees together from various departments (“Cross-Functional Teams,” n.d.). The 
cross-utilization study led to Northwestern to be one of the first companies in the United 
States to create an Information Technology department (“Cross-Functional Teams,” n.d.). 
This gave Northwestern a huge advantage as computers became more popular in 
the business world. The success created by Northwestern was followed by a slow growth 
of employee cross-utilization throughout the 1960s and 1970s. That growth accelerated 
rapidly in the 1980s. Through the years it has been determined that to successfully use 
cross-functional employees there are a few principles that must be followed:  “Team 
members must come from the correct functional areas, the team must have both the 
authority and the accountability to accomplish the mission it has been given, and 
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management must provide adequate resources and support for the team, both moral and 
financial” (“Cross-Functional Teams,” n.d.). 
In the DOD, hiring freezes and reduction in forces are causing an increasing loss 
of knowledge and experience. Organizations are seeing their experienced and 
knowledgeable employees retiring or taking promotions with other organizations while 
any replacement hires are younger and lacking experience. This is especially true in the 
RDT&E career field. The current personnel policies that are structured around the TDA 
are creating a huge knowledge gap in those organizations, because the policies provide 
little opportunity to train incoming personnel since incumbents must vacate their 
positions before replacements can be hired. This rigid structure also applies to moving 
people within the organization to make an organization perform better because they are 
assigned to a specific position that is funded by specific dollars, and moving people to 
different positions requires lengthy personnel actions. Finally, the slow TDA change 
process and rigid personnel structure are not agile enough to support broad employee 
position descriptions or rapid organizational restructuring to support the diverse and 
dynamic missions performed by RDT&E organizations 
3. Scope / Methodology
The research and recommendations contained in this thesis will focus on Army 
research and development organizations. The data was collected through literature 
focusing on cross-utilization of resources, lean practices, actual execution data 
from R&D organizations, guidance documents sent from Army Materiel Command, 
and pilot data from ongoing initiatives that focus on managing resources to workload. 
4. Thesis Statement
This research will determine to what level a cross-functional TDA pool can be 
used to help increase productivity and ensure that the right personnel are available with 
the right skill sets when needed to meet RDT&E organizations’ mission requirements. 
This study will analyze the current system and a cross-functional solution to determine if 
direct and or reimbursable funds can be used to support the cross-functional structure 
without hindering the hiring and TDA documentation requirements. 
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5. Report Organization 
This study is written in five chapters. Chapter I provides the background to the 
research. Chapter II provides the objectives, questions and methodology of the research. 
Chapter III is a review of literature on organizational change and the formation of cross-
functional teams. Chapter IV covers the analysis of the data and the methodology of the 
data analysis. Chapter V will discuss the conclusions and make any recommendation 
found from this research.  
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter starts with the problem statement and turns that problem statement 
into the research objectives and ultimately establishes the research questions. The 
purpose and benefits are examined as to how some organizations with in the Army can 
take advantage of some cross-utilization human resource structures. The scope and 
methodology for the research are introduced, and the thesis statement is defined. It 
finishes with the organization of the report and how the information is laid out in each 
chapter. 
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III. CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 
A. IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
Cross-utilization can be a powerful tool for achieving synergy, expanding 
capacity and increasing efficiency within an organization. However, literature suggests 
there can be pitfalls to implementing this change without a well-thought-out plan, 
measurable objectives and achievable goals. In the effort to implement cross-utilization, 
cross-training, and other synergy strategies it is critical that leaders ensure their actions 
are in alignment with the organization’s goals and principles so that value will be added 
to the organization’s processes.  
1. Synergy Strategies 
In business, synergy “refers to the ability of two or more units or companies to 
generate greater value working together than they could working apart” (Goold & 
Campbell, 1998). Common synergy strategies observed in businesses include: 
• Shared Know-How 
• Coordinated Strategies 
• Combined Business Creation 
The Shared Know-How strategy uses cross-utilization and training to expose 
individuals to new ways of thinking, procedures and methods. This effort adds value to 
the organization and organizational processes by expanding the collective pool of 
knowledge and shared best practices. Shared Know-How strategies can be implemented 
through top-down-driven policy but can also exist if leaders create a sharing and 
collaborative environment (Goold & Campbell, 1998). 
Coordinated Strategies, directed by leadership, can be a tool to reduce 
competition within the organization and leverage the organization’s full talents and 
capabilities against a competitor. However, this top-down-driven strategy must be careful 
not to stifle innovation and creativity within the organization (Goold & Campbell, 1998). 
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 Combined Business Creation is an excellent example of cross-utilization and 
training in action. Organizations can enter into new activities, or reinvent themselves in a 
changing environment, by combining internal talents and distinct activities in new teams 
and partnerships. By rearranging the organization’s units and components, regeneration 
and increased capacity can be achieved without adding excessive overhead or costs 
(Goold & Campbell, 1998). 
2. Bias Roadblocks 
Biases exist that render leaders and managers unable to realize the drawbacks and 
opportunity costs of implementing cross-utilization, cross-training, and other efforts to 
achieve synergy. These biases include: 
• Synergy Bias 
• Skills Bias 
• Upside Bias 
Synergy Bias exists when leadership feels compelled to blindly implement 
synergy strategies by overestimating the benefits without taking into account the risks. 
This bias can occur when leadership feels compelled to increase profits, reorganize 
following acquisition of another company or unit, or it can be emotionally-driven because 
it’s something leadership feels they are supposed to do because of their positions within 
the organization (Goold & Campbell, 1998). 
Leadership will suffer from Skills Bias if there is a “lack of operating knowledge, 
personal relationships, or facilitative skills required to achieve meaningful collaboration, 
or they may simply lack the patience and force of character needed to follow through.” 
(Goold & Campbell, 1998) Leaders must possess the required skills, or include someone 
on the team with the appropriate background, before the synergy strategy is implemented. 
Without these critical skills, disparate units and stovepipes within the organization will 
never be brought together to form a collaborative and effective team.  
Unforeseen consequences, both good and bad, will occur when synergy strategies 
are implemented. Upside Bias exists when leadership focuses only on the good and fails 
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to recognize the negative impacts of synergy. Positive outcomes reinforce the decision to 
implement a synergy strategy as a good one. The commonly held belief that 
“cooperation, sharing, and teamwork are intrinsically good for organizations” perpetuates 
this bias (Goold & Campbell, 1998).  
3. Additional Challenges to Change Implementation 
Factors for success during the formation of cross-functional teams include strong 
leadership, clear goals, accountability and a systematic approach that prioritizes success. 
A study of 95 teams in 25 major corporations found 75% were dysfunctional because 
they failed three or more of the following criteria: 
• Staying on budget 
• Staying on schedule 
• Remaining within specifications 
• Meeting customers’ needs and expectations 
• Maintaining alignment with organizations goals 
• Institutional inertia and the inability to breakdown existing organizational 
stovepipes is a major obstacle in the path to success (Tabrizi, 2015). 
 
B. TOOLS FOR SUCCESS 
1. Soft Factors 
A disciplined approach that considers both potential benefits and negative 
outcomes must be followed to successfully implement a synergy strategy that involves 
cross-functional teams and cross-training. Leaders must effectively convey the strategic 
goals they seek, but also articulate the operational objectives that must be achieved to 
reach that goal. With that knowledge, managers down the line can implement action 
plans in alignment with leadership’s vision. Additional recommendations for success 
include: 
• Identify an end-to-end accountable leader 
• Clearly establish and identify goals, resources, and deadlines 
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• Evaluation to see if goals and objectives are being achieved (Tabrizi, 
2015) 
Change management is often centered on the ideas of leadership, organizational 
culture, and motivation. These ideas are important and critical to effective change 
management but by their nature are difficult to quantify and measure. Change 
management must also include hard aspects that are measurable, quantifiable, and 
reportable.  
2. Hard Factors 
a. Duration, Integrity, Commitment and Energy 
Four key factors identified in change management are Duration, Integrity, 
Commitment and Effort (DICE). Duration is the amount “of time until the change 
program is completed if it has a short life span; if not short, the amount of time between 
reviews of milestones” (Sirkin, Keenan, & Jackson, 2005, p. 3). A common assumption is 
that shorter projects with fewer milestones have a greater chance of success. However, 
research suggests longer projects with frequent reviews and milestones are more 
successful. Reviews and milestones provide the opportunity to identify and mitigate 
unplanned risks before they become issues and find solutions for issues that have 
presented themselves. Milestone reviews also provide the opportunity to assess whether 
stakeholders’ needs and expectations are being met (Sirkin et al., 2005). 
Integrity refers to ability of managers, supervisors, and staff to effectively 
perform the tasks necessary for the desired changes to occur. To successfully implement 
change, senior leadership must build a team with the rights skills and attributes to 
accomplish the task. A capable and effective leader, not manager, must effectively lead 
the change initiative. Top managers excel at minimizing risk while maintaining the status 
quo. Change initiatives require changing the status quo, which demands a leader with 
problem-solving skills, disciplined methods, a sense of accountability, organizational 
know-how, and the ability to operate in unclear, uncharted territory (Sirkin et al., 2005).  
Commitment to change refers to buy-in from the very top of the organization and 
also the workers who will be executing the new procedures and processes. To instill a 
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sense of commitment, the organization must present a united front from the top-down 
with the support of middle management. Action that supports the change initiative, not 
just words, is also needed to cement change. Leaders and managers have to “talk the talk” 
but also “walk the walk.” Prior to initiating change, leadership can solicit ideas and inputs 
from mid and lower level managers. If their inputs are seen and heard in guidance issued 
from the top, the change initiative has a better chance of gaining momentum with a series 
of quick victories (Sirkin et al., 2005). 
Effort refers to the amount of increased work associated with a change initiative. 
Piling excessive demands on a fully burdened workforce is not a strategy for success. Not 
only will the change initiative likely fail but normal work will also be compromised. A 
general rule-of-thumb is no workload should increase more than 10% during a change 
initiative. Delaying unimportant projects or tasks and increasing the size of the workforce 
creates the capacity to initiate change but both options take time and money (Sirkin et al., 
2005). 
b. DICE Framework 
Applying these definitions with the DICE Framework provides a standard and 
measurable tool to determine whether the conditions for change exist before the change is 
initiated and also during the initiative. By using this tool, senior leadership can take the 
necessary steps, tradeoffs, and interventions to remove roadblocks on the path to success.  
The first step in this process is to measure each of the DICE factors on scale of 1 
to 4. Low scores mean the factor will contribute to the change initiative’s success while a 
high score will be a detractor. Recommended questions include: 
• Duration:  Do formal project reviews occur regularly?  What is the 
average time between reviews?  
• Integrity:  Are the team leaders capable?  How strong are team members’ 
skills and motivations? 
• Commitment:  Do senior executives regularly communicate the reason for 
the change and the importance of its success?  Do the employees most 
affected by the change understand the reason for it and believe it is 
worthwhile? 
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• Effort:  What is the percentage of increased effort employees must make 
to implement the change effort? 
Researchers studied 225 change projects and found there were three distinct zones 
within the DICE Framework. Scores between 7 and 14 are normally successful and fall 
within the Win Zone. Scores between 14 and 17 are unpredictable and are in the Worry 
Zone. Unsuccessful changes initiatives scored greater than 17 and are in the Woe Zone 
(Sirkin et al., 2005). 
c. Using the DICE Framework 
The DICE Framework can be used to track the progress of change projects and 
create early-warning indicators that a project is going off-track and no longer likely to 
succeed. Tracking progress can identify areas in need of greater resources and also areas 
consuming too many resources. Personnel movement, reprioritization, and increased 
milestone reviews can help an initiative get back on glideslope and back into the Win 
Zone (Sirkin et al., 2005). 
A second recommendation, similar to the first but on larger scale, is for 
organizations to use the DICE Framework to manage a portfolio of projects. The first 
recommendation focused on the scores of an individual project while the second 
recommendation is focused on a portfolio of projects, each with individual scores, as part 
of a portfolio meant to create change. Priorities must be established within the portfolio 
with the understanding that efforts to move a priority project into the Win Zone might 
move an accompanying project into the Worry or Woe Zone (Sirkin et al., 2005). It is 
necessary for leadership to understand the relationships between projects and the second 
and third order effects a decision on one project makes throughout the entire portfolio.  
The final recommendation is to use the DICE Framework to force conversation 
within the organization. This conversation helps everyone involve understand the end 
state to be achieved by sharing a common language and shared analytical processes 
regarding the DICE factors.  
Conversations about DICE scores are particularly useful for large-scale 
transformations that cut across business units, functions, and locations. In this situation, it 
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is critical to find the right balance between centralized oversight and controls that ensure 
everyone in the organization takes the effort seriously and the autonomy required for 
transformation to succeed. Teams must have the flexibility and incentive to produce 
customized solutions for their markets, functions, and competitive environments. This 
balance is difficult to achieve without an explicit consideration of the DICE variables 
(Sirkin et al., 2005). 
Leadership can use the DICE factors discussed above to create standardized, 
understandable, and quantifiable framework to understand change initiatives. This 
framework enables meaningful discussions and creates a collaborative environment to 
leverage the insights and ideas of top-level executives, middle management, and those 
working on the frontlines of the change initiative.  
C. CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS 
Cross-functional teams provide the means to implement change within an 
organization. These teams are defined as “a small group of individuals that cross formal 
departmental boundaries and levels of hierarchy (IMA, 1994). The goal of a cross-
functional team is to add value to the organization, organizational processes, and 
ultimately the customer. To be effective, a cross-functional team must communicate 
effectively, coordinate disparate activities, and leverage the unique skills each team 
member provides the team. Supporting organizational structures, flexibility, 
accountability, a defined purpose, and training programs are enablers needed for the team 
to succeed (IMA, 1994). Forming cross-functional teams can create many benefits for an 
organization but the potential risks must be understood and mitigated to be successful. 
1. Benefits of Cross-Functional Teams 
a. Shared Mental Model 
Shared mental models are used to organize information to form an understanding 
of a system’s functions, the system’s current status, the effect inputs will have on the 
system’s condition, and the system’s operating environment. Within a team, a shared 
mental model is “knowledge and understanding about the team’s purpose, characteristics, 
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connections and linkages among collective actions, and various roles and behavior 
patterns required of individual members to successfully complete collective action.”  
(Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002, p. 5).  
Shared mental models create the cognitive framework for team members to 
understand the dynamics associated with teamwork. Individual members are able to 
predict what information, support, or assistance team members require to successfully 
complete a task. Team performance is increased when individual members possess a 
shared mental model (Marks et al., 2002). 
b. Coordination and Backup 
Team members’ actions must be coordinated in both time and space through a 
combination of mental and action-oriented-processes. This coordination is necessary to 
ensure team goals are achieved. Effective communication is a critical component for 
successful coordination. Poor communication creates inefficiencies and leads to a 
breakdown in the proper sequencing of events.  
Backup occurs in the team environment when one teammate assists another either 
partially or in full while performing a task or function. Backup can be action-oriented but 
can also be part of verbal feedback mechanisms. Research on the subject suggests these 
activities are “critical to team effectiveness, especially in challenging and highly 
interdependent, time-critical situations in which undetected mistakes by members 
jeopardize team success” (Marks et al., 2002, p. 6). 
2. Training Methods 
a. Positional Clarification 
Positional clarification is a simple form of training and involves a verbal 
discussion among team members. Each member presents information on his function, 
role, and responsibilities in the team. The goal of positional clarification is to increase 
awareness of the roles other team members perform but does not require knowledge on 
how other team members perform their tasks.  
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b. Positional Modeling 
Positional modeling includes the same roles and responsibilities discussion 
required in positional clarification but adds an observation requirement. Team members 
must observe other members of the team perform in the work environment. These 
observations of inter-role behavior provides team members with a greater understanding 
of the contributions made by other team members as the coordination required to enable 
those contributions.  
c. Positional Rotational 
The most in-depth and detailed training method is positional rotational. Team 
members actively participate and perform the roles of other team members. This hands-
on experience gives team members a deeper, more ingrained understanding of other team 
members’ roles and responsibilities. This form of training requires the most time to 
conduct and places the greatest demand on organizational resources.  
3. Effectiveness of Training Methods 
Michelle Marks, C. Shawn Burke, Mark Sabella, and Stephen Zaccaro used 
computer simulation methodology to conduct research on whether cross-training 
improved the creation of shared mental models within a team, the impact the model made 
on team performance and coordination.  
In their first experiment, the researchers found the two least in-depth forms of 
training, positional clarification and modeling, resulted in a greater amount of shared 
mental models compared to the control group who did not receive cross-training. It was 
noted there was not a significant difference in the percentage of sharing between the two 
forms of training. 
The second experiment found very similar results when the more detailed types of 
training, positional modeling and positional rotational were compared to a control group 
receiving the least in-depth form of training, positional clarification. The more in-depth 
training programs created more shared mental models than was created in the control 
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group, but there was only minimal difference between the groups receiving more in-depth 
training. 
The researchers determined “cross-training facilitated the development of team-
interaction mental models” (Marks et al., 2002, p. 10). More in-depth training results in 
the creation of stronger mental models among teammates but the most in-depth form of 
training, positional rotational, produces only marginal results compared to the 
intermediate option, positional modeling. 
Therefore, the level of investment in cross-training should only be made to the 
extent needed for the team to succeed at the assigned task. Teams requiring extensive 
coordination, feedback mechanisms, and backup assistance should receive positional 
modeling training when the “sequence and timing of interdependent actions is critical” 
for success (Marks et al., 2002, p. 11). Positional clarification is adequate for teams that 
only need a basic understanding of team members’ roles and responsibilities to make 
communication effective and make appropriate trade-off decisions. The most in-depth 
and resource-intensive form of training, positional rotational, should be considered only 
when “the severity of consequences of team failure, the logistics involved in finding an 
external replacement, and the resource investment in resources” is analyzed and 
considered (Marks et al., 2002, p. 11). 
D. RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS 
1. Reduction in Core Competencies 
A loss or reduction of core competencies may occur when an organization is 
realigned under a team structure. Technical specializations that were once protected by 
functional boundaries and organizational stovepipes can be lost in a team environment 
that prioritizes a broad portfolio of functions rather than focused, deeper specializations. 
This erosion of capability might be a slow process as the organization’s culture, beliefs, 
and assumptions adapt as part of the change implementation. Core competencies can also 
be eroded as the organization’s support elements are realigned to support a team 
structure.  
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2. Increased Costs 
The realignment of support elements and resources in a team environment will 
lead to an increase in operating costs for the organization during transition. The need for 
team-focused information will place new demands on the organization’s communication 
and information systems. These systems must be able to meet the new demand while still 
serving the areas in the organization that are not part of the change initiative. 
Performance management and human resource systems must also be realigned to support 
and recognize team performance as well as individual contribution to the team’s success. 
An example would be “a transition from a tenure or grade-based system to a salary 
scheme that rewards for skills or knowledge contributed to the team as a unit” (Cross, 
2000, p. 33). 
3. Confusion and Conflicting Goals  
Confusion will also create risk during the transition. Employees may experience 
anxiety and doubt as their individual identities are woven into the team’s identity. 
Individual employees might also feel uncomfortable when making the shift to a team-
based performance system no longer based on the individual.  
 Productivity will lag while cross-training occurs and teams form. Individuals 
must learn new processes and break old habits for the team to be successful. The potential 
exists for individuals to willingly or unconsciously cling to old habit patterns. This will 
further reduce productivity by creating inconsistencies with word and action as 
individuals are pulled between competing interests (Kegan & Lahey, 2001). Underground 
power struggles may also hinder the transition as formal and informal networks are 
realigned in a team-based environment (Cross, 2000).  
E. ALTERNATIVES TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS 
1. Community of Practice 
If the risks and costs of forming a team-based organization outweigh the benefits, 
forming a community of practice is a viable alternative to still capture some of the 
advantages teams offer. A community of practice is “an informal group of people who 
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interact with one another regularly on work related issues and challenges” and are “very 
effective vehicles for collaboration and knowledge transfer in helping participants solve 
problems quickly” (Cross, 2000, p. 34). Communities of practice are more fluid in their 
mission, membership and duration compared to formal teams and do not require 
organizations to realign human resources and performance systems. This simple 
alternative to a team-based structure can help an organization succeed at innovation by 
“easing the transfer of relevant practices, reusing explicit knowledge assets, and 
refreshing knowledge bases”  (Cross, 2000, p. 34). 
2. Enable Collaboration 
Organizations can also take steps to enable collaboration within existing 
organizational structures if teams are not a viable or cost-effective solution. One option is 
to map out critical knowledge processes and identify key nodes where improved 
collaboration will yield positive results and increased efficiencies. Once these nodes are 
identified, the means to effectively collect, analyze, and disseminate information must be 
available. Electronic bulletin boards, video teleconference, and collaborative software can 
bring people together that are otherwise physically separated (Cross, 2000). 
Administrative and human resource policies that focus on managing 
organizational knowledge will foster and encourage collaboration. Employees should be 
incentivized to develop “a deep technical understanding of a specialty combined with an 
understanding of upstream and downstream activities in a core process” (Cross, 2000, p. 
35). This will develop a workforce able to rapidly and effectively solve problems within 
the organization because of their professional networks and familiarity with 
organizational processes. 
 23 
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TDA 
METHODOLOGY ON ARMY STAFFING REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter focuses on how the current TDA functions, where it is applicable, 
where it breaks down, and how decisions made using the TDA can effect an organization. 
The overall goal is to analyze the current TDA to show how it does not meet the 
goal to achieve an agile workforce that has the ability to respond to the ever-changing 
environments that it will encounter. “Force-employment is defined as Army forces in 2025 
conducting decentralized, distributed, and integrated operations to prevent, shape, and win 
using agile, responsive, and innovative combined arms capabilities and special operations 
forces” (US Army, White Paper, 2014). 
The key to obtaining an agile workforce is to have the resources available to meet 
the changing needs. This plays an important role in the RDT&E environment where the 
workforce needs to be able to adjust its skill set to best meet new requirements. The 
current TDA process, with a lengthy and labor-intensive process, stifles the ability for an 
organization to react in a fast enough to be both efficient and effective. 
The current TDA process is the mechanism used to allocate resources to the 
assigned mission. In order to reprogram these resources, a reprogramming actions must 
be processed as an out-of-cycle TDA change. Reprogramming actions for reimbursable 
manpower must clearly show the type of resource (grade and series of the required 
employee), the reimbursing command (REIM-C) and the source of reimbursement 
(REIM-S) (Customer). 
The current TDA process is a rigid, top-down process that can be difficult and 
time consuming to follow. The issue with this process is as levels of reporting are added 
to the TDA change process it becomes extremely cumbersome and in the end breaks 
down. The process is not set up to handle an organization whose business model, such as 
the one used by RDT&E organization, is to use a single resource to support multiple 
customers and projects throughout a given year.  
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The challenge of managing the TDA is illustrated by an example using the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC), an Army Major Command (MACOM), whose commander 
reports directly to the HQDA. The AMC Organizational Chart is depicted in Figure 1.  
Figure 1.  Army Materiel Command Organizational Chart 
Source: Department of the Army, (2009, September 16), Army Materiel Command, 
retrieved from http://imagestack.co/121816644-army-command-structure-organization-
chart.html. 
 One of AMC’s major subordinate commands is the Research, Development, and 
Engineering Command (RDECOM), which has a large number of subordinate units. If 
the subordinate command wants to make a change to a unit TDA, here are the steps that 
must be followed:  
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• Identify requirement 
• Submit request for out-of-cycle through RDT&E organization to 
RDECOM 
• RDECOM review / Concur 
• Submit request up to AMC 
• AMC review / Concur  
• Submit request over to HQDA  
• HQDA review / Concur  
Depending on the number of deferrals, disapprovals, or requests for justification 
or clarification, this process can take months. Figure 2 diagrams this process. 
Figure 2.   TDA Map Process 
 
Adapted from  Department of the Army, (2013, July 1), Force Development and 
Documentation (Army Regulation 71-32), Washington, DC:  Headquarters, Department 
of the Army. 
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The current TDA process is set up to manage in a one to one style relationship. 
This means one resource to one effort. In other words a TDA may authorize a single 
resource (i.e. General Service (GS) GS 11, 0343(program assistants)) to a single program 
for a full year. This program assistant will only support this single effort for the year. 
This one to one type relationship is usually found in sustainment type operations where 
the work is constant and repeatable year to year. These types of operations focus on either 
maintaining a product or the administrative support that goes into managing a program. 
Since the work is consistent and definable from year to year there is also a general ability 
to establish a standardized organizational design. An example of where a TDA does work 
is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Functional TDA 
 
 
The level of effort and required resources are standard year to year with little variability 
in workload requirements. Source:  Jones, Marc, (16 January 2015), AMC-RDECOM 
Laboratory Business Model Discussion, presented at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.  
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1. TDA Process in a RDT&E Organization  
The one to one relationship does not work well in the reimbursable RDT&E 
environment where requirements and required resources can change multiple times 
throughout the year. RDT&E organizations have a dynamic organizational design where 
the organization often adjusts on the fly to fit the immediate mission requirements. These 
organizations often end up having reimbursable funded overhires which allow them to 
work in a one resource to many effort relationship. In other words a single resource can 
perform work for multiple customers on multiple projects utilizing various combinations 
of funds throughout a single year. 
To establish a baseline of how an RDT&E organization functions, data was pulled 
on six different RDT&E organizations in the Army and examined the customers the 
employees currently supported. This involved analyzing roughly 11,821 different 
employees’ labor charges, 83,000 entries to determine how many customers an average 
employee supports in a given year. The 11,821 data records showed that RDT&E 
employees support on an average of 2.52 customers per year. The data was pulled from 
the Army financial system, GFEBS, as is displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1.   RDT&E Work 
 
Number of customer supported per employee. Adapted from: U.S. Army General Fund 
Enterprise Business System, (2015), retrieved from https://prodep.gfebs-erp.army.mil/ 
Average 2.458745 Average 2.6375
Max 10 Max 8
Min 1 Min 1
Std Dev 1.522685 Std Dev 1.157336
Average 4.062633 Average 1.700599
Max 10 max 8
Min 2 min 1
Std Dev 1.622331 Std Dev 1.107126
Average 2.311199 Average 2.1585
Max 14 Max 10
Min 1 Min 1
Std Dev 1.629123 Std Dev 1.386824
Organization A Organization B
Organization C Organization D
Organization E Organization F
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TDA guidance requires identification of each resource in terms of grade, series, 
project supported, and source of funding which in the RDT&E world would mean any 
customer that a resource supports. Under the current TDA process any time one of these 
resources deviates from the job description for more than 10% of their reporting period, 
there is a requirement to do an out-of-cycle change. The data shows that employees in all 
six organizations on average support more than one customer per year. Based on this 
guidance, and to keep TDAs accurate this would equate to a minimum of 11,821 out-of-
cycle changes to the TDA. This does not take into account any changes to the resources 
identification requirements mentioned earlier in the paragraph.  
The statistical data presented above demonstrates that an RDT&E organization 
under a TDA business model cannot accurately maintain a valid TDA. The simple fact 
that in theory an out-of-cycle TDA change request would need to be submitted and 
approved multiple times a day to ensure the TDA and the data it represents is accurate 
makes the current process less than optimal. This situation is potentially dangerous to an 
RDT&E organization since decisions regarding staffing will be made using inaccurate 
TDA data. 
This data was then broken down into a smaller subset to analyze how many 
customers and different programs an employee charges to get a better understanding of 
the possible workload that would be required to ensure the TDA remains accurate. 
Initially, a sampling of charges from 2,300 employees from organization F was 
analyzed. These employees supported weapon system, munition, and quality / system 
safety divisions. The data showed even more convincingly the amount of out-of-cycle 
changes that would need to be processed. Even if the out-of-cycle changes were 
processed as required, they would still not be fully accurate since they can only be done 
monthly. Certain employees support multiple programs and customers per month. A final 
look at a sampling of organization F’s quality division shows graphically how the worked 
charged is in line with the data presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2.   Organization F – Weapon, Munition, Quality/System Safety 
Division 
 
Adapted from U.S. Army General Fund Enterprise Business System, (2015), retrieved 
from https://prodep.gfebs-erp.army.mil/ 
The graph in Figure 4 shows a sample of actual employee work charged in Fiscal 
Year (FY)14 for an RDT&E organization. The full data looked at 100 engineers with the 
following basic results displayed in Table 3. 
Figure 4.  Subset of RDT&E Employees Actual Work at Organization F 
 
Adapted from U.S. Army General Fund Enterprise Business System, (2015), retrieved 
from https://prodep.gfebs-erp.army.mil/ 
Average 6.25 Average 2.92
Min 1 Min 1
Max 43 Max 13
Range 42 Range 12
Std Dev 5.74 Std Dev 2.18



























Organization F - Work by customer and Program
# of customers # of prog
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Table 3.   Actual Work at Organization F 
 
Adapted from U.S. Army General Fund Enterprise Business System, (2015), retrieved 
from https://prodep.gfebs-erp.army.mil/ 
The requirements in an RDT&E organization are much less stable based on the 
type of work being conducted. The employees are required to be budgeted for two full 
years in advance, but rarely can be to the level of detail required by the current TDA 
process. The RDT&E organization reviewed used the approach of applying resources that 
best fit the efforts being completed. They did not manage the workforce to a structured 
TDA. The initial TDA was established based on a “best estimate” of what a program 
would require and then executed that program in a manner that allowed for optimal use of 
available resources. In Figure 5, the image shows how a project was originally planned 
for on the TDA versus the actual execution of the effort. 
Figure 5.  Planned vs. Actual Execution of Project 
 
Source:  Jones, Marc, (16 January 2015), AMC-RDECOM Laboratory Business Model, 
discussion, presented at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.  
Average 6.04 Average 2.78
Max 29 Max 8
Min 1 Min 1
Range 28 Range 7
Std Dev 4.997839533 Std Dev 1.565758602
Programs Supported Customers Supported
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The data shows the initial estimation for the project required two FTE general 
engineers, one FTE mechanical engineer, one FTE aerospace engineer, one FTE chemical 
engineer, and three FTE general physical science employees (one SES and two GS 
employees). This initial estimate required eight TDA positions. When the program was 
executed using the available resources it actually utilized six FTEs in positions such as 
Clerk and Administrative, multiple engineering disciplines, and chemistry. This example 
shows how the TDA overestimated the number of FTEs and incorrectly estimated the 
skill sets required to meet the requirements to budget for full FTEs. The TDA does not 
have the flexibility to budget partial FTEs, making it nearly impossible to define the 
required resources. Figure 6 shows where the initial TDA estimate underestimated the 
required FTEs to meet program requirements.  
Figure 6.  Underestimation of Requirements 
 
Source: Jones, Marc, (16 January 2015), AMC-RDECOM Laboratory Business Model 
Discussion, presented at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.  
This example shows an expected effort only requiring two FTE mathematicians. 
However, in the year of execution the project required 5.11 FTEs of ten different 
disciplines. The example above show what is referred to as “blended manpower.” 
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Blended manpower occurs when a resource is charted to multiple customers and fund 
types throughout a FY. This cross-utilization of resources ensures they are being applied 
to a program when most effective. The concepts of cross-utilization or blending 
manpower are not considered the correct method of program management under the 
current TDA process. 
2. Decisions Made Using TDA 
As previously stated, the TDA is used to make human capital and manpower 
requirements decisions. This means the data in the current TDA is one tool used to 
determine if the Army has the correct personnel resources to complete a mission. This 
can be detrimental to an RDT&E organization because decisions are made based on 
inaccurate information that can result in an organization’s hiring being restricted based on 
the assumption that it is currently overstaffed. This is a danger especially when it comes 
to the reimbursable RDT&E organizations that are unable to maintain the accuracy of 
their TDAs due to the sheer number of customers and programs their employees support 
throughout a given year. 
Decisions such as hiring at a 6:1 ratio have been made to try and reduce the size 
of organizations based on the fact that they have hired beyond the authorizations listed in 
their TDAs. This restriction only allows an organization to hire 1 resource for every six 
that leave the organization. This type of decision can have extreme adverse effects 
especially organizations which has a large percentage of the workforce eligible for 
retirement. The potential loss of institutional knowledge is a major risk and a hiring 
restriction limits the ability to backfill retiring employee with enough time to train new 
employees in order to ensure the program / customer being supported is not greatly 
impacted. 
The original intent of mandating organizations to get down to or below their 
current approved TDA was initially imposed to ensure the organizations would remain 
affordable and not grow to size that could not be supported. One organization analyzed 
would need to reduce the workforce 1,100 people to comply with the TDA. The initial 
effect on the organization that this would have is it reduces its capability and capacity to 
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provide support to the Army and DOD as the principal RDT&E organization in its 
current field. The Army’s “Lethality” competency area is “world class” as cited in the 
Army Science Board Summer Study 2013, which means the cut in resources would not 
be easily mitigated through private industry (Department of the Army, Army Vision, 
2014).  
A cut in resources of this magnitude could potentially cause the organization to 
lose any gains made in core competency areas such as prototyping, fuze management, 
small arms technology, quality and product assurance and logistics research and 
engineering. These capabilities have been built up over the past ten plus years through 
significant investments in infrastructure and equipment. These investments likely would 
not be recouped, resulting in being part of the lost resource.  
The cut in people may reduce the size of the workforce and improve affordability, 
but it can severely reduce the organization’s capability and capacity to meet mission 
requirements. These requirements help produce technologies that help our Army to 
remain both lethal and agile. The RDT&E environment is going to become even more 
important as the Army strives to meet the goals set out in the Force 2025 strategy that 
will require the Army to be leaner and able to react from many different fronts. Old 
systems will need to be upgraded and new systems will need to be developed to ensure 
missions can be completed. This will require the RDT&E workforce to remain world 
class and industry leading when it comes to developing and supplying the troops with the 
latest and greatest system.  
As shown in this chapter, the business model used by RDT&E organizations is 
not well supported by the current TDA process to accurately measure the human resource 
requirements. The decision made using information from the current TDA process can 
have severe unintended consequences since the information the process is supplying can 
be inaccurate. Results of these decisions can negatively affect an organization, potentially 
causing it to not be able to meet mission requirements. The statistical data shows that the 
current process would need daily updates to accurately reflect the RDT&E organization it 
is measuring. That frequency of updates is not feasible under the current TDA process, 
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meaning the data in a TDA will remain inaccurate. Therefore, decisions made using the 
current process do not always achieve the desired outcome.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Army has used the current TDA business model for nearly 80 years with little 
to no change. This model works well in a stable state organization that performs the same 
mission and function repeatedly year after year. An example of this is in a sustainment 
organization that deals with base operations where they are able to offer a person to a 
position with little need to deviate from that model. This allows the Army to easily 
determine budget commitments and predict future requirements with a certain degree of 
accuracy.  
During the 80 years that the Army has used the current TDA process, private 
industry has been forced to move from a similar manning process to a more agile 
business model that allows them to provide goods and services as inexpensively as 
possible while keeping their overhead at a level that allows them to still make a profit. 
The only way industry could make this happen was to change its approach in relationship 
to using resources. Manufacturing, retail and fast food industries have lead the charge in 
obtaining an agile work force by implementing a cross-utilization business model to 
manage their employees.  
The Army’s “Force 2025” goal is to create a leaner, agile force equal to, or more 
capable than today’s force. Lean and agile does not necessarily need to mean smaller or 
less dependent on human resource. Instead, the force needs to provide more capability 
with the resources provided to reduce areas of waste. Waste can mean reducing 
duplicative efforts, adhering to policies that no longer apply but are still enforced, and 
underutilization of resources.  
The Army’s current TDA business model is incapable of meeting the “Force 
2025” requirements especially as it relates to the RDT&E organizations that must have 
the flexibility to move resources quickly to meet the ever-changing warfighter 
requirements. The current TDA model is not an accurate way to assess all Army 
organizations regarding human capital resources. The TDA should not be used as a one-
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size-fits-all approach as it can have severe unintended negative effects on an 
organization. The key to using the current TDA process is to use it only on the 
organizations that have the capability to be accurately tracked. Organizations that fit this 
process have well-defined customer requirements that change little from year to year. 
These organizations’ resources are easily budgeted for and mostly support a single 
customer for an entire year. In these organizations the current TDA model has the ability 
to produce accurate human capital data. However, only 90% of the Army falls into this 
category. The other 10% of the Army, the reimbursable funded R&D organizations, 
cannot be accurately measured, resourced, or manned using the current TDA process.  
The Army’s RDT&E organizations’ business model, which is adapted from the 
principals of cross-utilization, does not fit with in the concepts of the TDA process and as 
a result causes the current TDA process to produce inaccurate information resulting in 
decisions that have an adverse effect on organizations. A cross-utilization business 
model, used in conjunction with a process similar to one being developed in the WfGAP 
will give an avenue for an organization to utilize resources amongst multiple programs 
throughout a given year. The business model RDT&E organizations follow allow them 
to work more efficiently and remain agile to ensure they have the capability and capacity 
to meet the changing needs of the warfighter. Unlike sustainment organizations whose 
mission and program requirements are relatively rigid, an RDT&E organization must be 
fluid, agile and able to change.  
Planning for an RDT&E project is difficult because of the nature of research and 
development. RDT&E can require multiple resources of different disciplines throughout 
the year based off each new discovery. Unlike sustainment organizations, these positions 
rarely require full FTEs. The RDT&E business model utilizes the proper resource at the 
proper time it is needed and then applies that resource to another program. This model 
allows the organizations to efficiently utilize and cross-utilize their resources, enabling 
them to sustain their capabilities and capacities to meet mission requirements. It also 
ensures organizations are agile enough to quickly transition from one technology 
development to the next depending on is needed in the current operational environment. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Change within very structured organizations such as the Army can prove very 
difficult and can meet a lot of resistance. This institutional inertia that resists change is 
rooted in the belief that we have always done it that way, and it works. Cross-utilization 
can be a powerful tool for achieving synergy, expanding capacity and increasing 
efficiency with in an organization. In order to implement change such as cross-utilization 
into the Army, it is critical that leaders ensure their actions are in alignment with the 
organization’s goals, and principles while ensuring that value is added to the 
organization’s processes. It is also important to make sure when an organization 
implements change, that it provides strong leadership, creates and communicates clear 
goals, accountability, and a systematic approach that prioritizes success. 
Using synergy strategies such as sharing know-how, sharing tangible resources, 
coordinating strategies and combining business creation will help effect the change 
required to move away from rigid business models. While using these strategies, it is 
important to steer clear of common biases such as synergy bias, skills bias and upside 
bias, in order to effectively allow the desired change to truly evolve. Along with these 
strategies, it is important to also address some of these challenges such as staying on 
budget and schedule, remaining within specifications, meeting customers’ needs and 
expectations, and maintaining within the organizations goals.  
One of the major tools for success in implementing change is the use of the DICE 
Framework. This framework provides key factors identified in change management. And 
include duration, integrity, commitment and effort. The DICE Framework provides a 
standard and measurable tool to determine whether the conditions for change exist before 
the change is initiated and also during the initiative. By using the DICE Framework, 
leadership can take steps to mitigate risks that might affect the effective implementation 
of the cross-utilization change. This framework also allows leaders to track progress and 
ensure the change is staying on the desired track. 
The decisions made using a TDA can have devastating unintended consequences 
that can negatively affect the capability to support the warfighter. There is a need for 
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other mechanisms to more accurately make resourcing decisions for the 10% of the Army 
that cannot be accurately measured using the current TDA process.  
An alternative such as the AMC WfGAP initiative needs to be considered to 
ensure an RDT&E organization can remain agile, with regard to workforce composition, 
while allowing it to meet the customers’ requirements. The WfGAP initiative allows 
organizations to hire and manage their workforce based off customer and program 
requirements. This pilot, which requires the organization to provide historical data that 
demonstrates sound budgeting practices and efficient resource utilization, allows the 
organization maximize the effectiveness of resources by applying them to multiple 
projects at a given time without having to adjust the TDA. This type of pilot also gives 
the organization the ability to staff itself above the approved TDA based on customer 
demand. Customer demand is determined using historical trends and projected funding 
which helps ensure the organization will be in the best possible position to meet the 
changing requirements of the customer base. An organization under the pilot program 
will be exempt from the hiring restriction imposed based off data generated from the 
current TDA process and can utilize more appropriate and effective resource 
management tools. 
The ability to hire for a position using a more open position requirement is also an 
approach that would enable an RDT&E organization to establish manning in a way that 
supports rapid mission changes. One way to make this possible is to use a generic 
position description to hire against. If a position called for a Mechanical Engineer, 
instead of using the position description for a Mechanical Engineer, use a position 
description for just an Engineer. This would allow the organization to hire based on 
current and projected mission requirements. The organization could then hire an 
employee that has multiple engineering disciplines. That employee then can support 
multiple mission requirements with multiple disciplines and not require a change to the 
TDA to truly keep it accurate. 
Establishing change is very challenging and takes a well-coordinated strategy 
before implementation begins. Using the DICE Framework to help implement this cross-
utilization change described in this paper will allow the RDT&E organizations to remain 
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flexible in their operation. The DICE Framework’s measurable matrices allows the Army 
to have a solid, proven process to control the change and ensure success. 
A disciplined approach, which looks at both potential benefits and negative 
outcomes, must be followed to successful implement a synergy strategy that involves 
cross-functional teams and cross-training. Leaders must effectively convey the strategic 
goals they seek but also articulate the operational objectives that must be achieved to 
reach that goal. With that knowledge, managers down the line can implement action 
plans in alignment with leadership’s vision. Additional recommendations for success 
include: 
• Identify an end-to-end accountable leader 
• Clearly establish and identify goals, resources, and deadlines 
• Evaluation to see if goals and objectives are being achieved 
 Recommendations for further research on this topic include studying the effects of 
hiring restrictions and hiring freezes on employee retention and the organization’s ability 
to retain core knowledge. Also, conduct research to determine if organizations in private 
industry have a process in effect that allows them to remain agile and lean with regards to 
human resource management. If so that model could be applied to Army organizations to 
be better positioned to meet the Force 2025 policy goals. Lastly, look at the applicability 
of the WfGAP program to other reimbursable organizations outside the RDT&E 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains an excerpt of a TDA to provide an example of what a 
TDA looks like and how the required strength and the authorized strength are determined. 
At the end of this appendix is a glossary of some of the headings for readability. 
Figure 7.  Sample TDA 
 
Source:  U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, (2015), FMSWeb, retrieved 
from https://fmsweb.army.mil/unprotected/splash/. 
This is an example of a TDA that shows only the first few sections of an 
organization. A TDA is normally approved under a parent UIC. That parent UIC ends in 
AA. Then each organization under that parent UIC receives a two-digit identifier such as 
01 or 02 etc. Each organization is then assigned a paragraph number. In this example it is 
paragraph 150. Then each section in that organization is assigned another paragraph 
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identifier to indicate which section belongs to that parent organization. In this example 
150 is the parent organization, and the sections are 150A, 150B etc. Within each 
paragraph there is a personnel line number that indicates how many different specialties 
work in that section. In paragraph 150, there are eight personnel line numbers. In 
paragraph 150A, there are 18 personnel line numbers. The next column is a position title, 
followed by the grade and personnel occupational specialty code. There is an area that 
allows for the identification of any unique skills the position requires such as the ability 
to read or speak another language. The CIVCC identifies the civilian career code, and in 
this example it is an acquisition career field. Moving over a few columns you see the 
REQ STR and AUTH STR. These two columns identify how many personnel is required 
to complete a mission (REQ STR) and how many of those positions have been funded 
(AUTH STR). The second to last column is the position is defined as a supervisory or 
non-supervisory. If it contains an S then it is supervisory, if it is empty it is not 
supervisory. 
This example shows that in paragraph 150 there is a total required strength of 
eight and an authorized strength of seven. The second Executive Assistant was not 
funded and there for the organization is not permitted to fill the 8th position.  
Likewise in paragraph 150A, there are 18 personnel lines. The required strength 
for this paragraph is 37 people. The authorized strength is 33. This division did not 
receive funding for two program analysts, and two acquisition management specialists.  
In paragraph 150B, there are eight personnel lines. The required strength for this 
paragraph is 18. The authorizations are also 18 so they will have a fully funded and 
staffed section in this paragraph.  
This is just a subset of an organization TDA and is meant to familiarize the reader 
with what a TDA looks like, a brief description on how to read the TDA, along with how 
an organization uses a TDA to determine their permission to hire personnel. Each one of 
these positions has a detailed position description assigned to it to determine the 
minimum qualification and duties of the person filling that position. 
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The REQ STR is developed by the organization during the planning program of a 
project or effort. If any point the requirements change and a new skill set is required a 
request to change the TDA needs to be processed and approved prior to the organization 
being able to fill the requirement.  
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